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In this research letter, we examine the impact of municipal budget policy on the percentage
of votes for the incumbent majority parties in subsequent elections. We contribute to the
academic literature by examining the combined influence of taxes, expenditures and debt.
Based on data for Flanders (Belgium) between 1994 and 2012, we find no significant associ-
ation between these budget variables and the actual election results.
1. Introduction
In recent decades, various contributions to the field of political economics have focused on the
association between budgetary policies and election results at the municipal level. As indicated
in Table 1, the results in this literature are variable. For example, studies by Bosch and Sollé-
Olé [1] and by Veiga and Veiga [2] report that, in Portugal and Spain, incumbent majorities
are punished for increased taxes and rewarded for additional investment expenditures. In con-
trast, Van Malderen and Gérard [3] find no association between the amount of or develop-
ments in income taxes or property taxes and election results at the municipal level in Wallonia
(Belgium). At the same time, recent studies have focused on the effect of budget policies in
neighbouring municipalities (‘yardstick voting’). The a priori expectation of this type of
research is that voters will punish their own municipal governments if the policies in the
neighbouring municipalities are more favourable by comparison. This expectation is con-
firmed for Spain and France in studies by Bosch and Sollé-Olé [1] and by Dubois and Paty [4].
These authors report evidence that higher taxes within a voter’s own municipality have a nega-
tive impact on the election results of the incumbent majority, as well as evidence that higher
taxes in the neighbouring municipalities have a positive impact.
All of the aforementioned studies focus on particular facets of municipal budgetary policy,
while ignoring other facets. Policies concerning municipal income and expenditures (and the
resulting debt level) are nevertheless closely related to each other. For example, increased taxes
could be expected to be punished less if they lead to popular investments or reductions in the
debt level. It therefore seems necessary to consider both of these factors together when examin-
ing the association between budgetary policy and election results at the municipal level. In
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econometric terms, this can cause an ‘omitted variable bias’ (i.e. distortion due to not control-
ling for variables that are associated with both the independent and the dependent variable).
In this study, we contribute to the literature by examining the effect of the development of
municipal taxes, expenditures and debt throughout a legislative period on the election results
for the majority parties. To this end, we present estimates that control for fixed effects at the
municipal level, as well as instrumental variable estimates.
2. Methods
2.1 Model
In our econometric analyses, we build on the model developed by Vermeir and Heyndels [5].
More specifically, we estimate the following choice function:
V ½t  1;t�it ¼ aV
½t  1;t�
it  1 þ bFit þ g
Pn
j¼1wij Fjt þ dXit þ mYt þ pPit þ εit: ð1Þ
The dependent variable in this expression, V ½t  1;t�it , stands for the percentage of votes that an
incumbent majority (all parties together) in municipality i receives in year t (i.e. the elections
following their policy term [t−1,t]). V ½t  1;t�it  1 is the percentage of votes for the same parties in the
previous municipal elections. Fit is a vector of variables that capture the budgetary policy in the
municipality at the end of the policy term and
Pn
j¼1 wij Fjt represents the mean of the same var-
iables in the adjacent municipalities (i.e. wij equals 1 divided by the number of adjacent munic-
ipalities in case i and j are adjacent and 0 otherwise). Xit, Yt and Pit are vectors of control
variables: municipal characteristics, year dummies and party-year dummies–capturing the six
main national parties in majorities: Open VLD, N-VA, CD&V, Sp.a, GROEN and Open VLD–
respectively. α, β, γ, δ, μ and π are the respective (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated. In an
initial approach, expression (1) is estimated by means of a linear regression (ordinary least
squares; OLS).
We adopt two main strategies to control for further determinants of the dependent variable
that cannot be observed in the research data. In the first strategy, we perform linear regressions
Table 1. Literature overview.
Study Data Method of
Analysis




Spain, 1991–2003 2SLS Developments in property taxes (-), developments in property taxes in neighbouring municipalities
(+)





Colombia, 1987–2002 FE Investments (+), budget deficits (-)





2SLS (Developments in) income taxes (0), (developments in) property taxes (0), (developments in) income
taxes in neighbouring municipalities (0), (developments in) property taxes in neighbouring
municipalities (0)
Veiga & Veiga [2] Portugal, 1979–2001 FE Investment expenditures (in election years) (+)
Vermeir &
Heyndels [5]
Flanders, 1982–2000 FE/2SLS Income taxes (0/-), property taxes (0/-), expenditures (0), income taxes in neighbouring
municipalities (0/+), property taxes in neighbouring municipalities (0), expenditures in
neighbouring municipalities (0)
Notes. FE stands for ‘fixed effects’ (linear regression with fixed effects at the level of the municipality or, in Drazen and Eslava [15], at the party-state level), and 2SLS
stands for ‘two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variable estimates). In the fourth column, ‘-‘ (‘0’) ((‘+’)) represents a negative (neutral) ((positive)) association with the
percentage of votes for the majority parties. A combination of these symbols (e.g. ‘0/-‘) indicates different results for different methods of analysis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221619.t001
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in which we control for fixed effects (FE) at the level of the municipality. With this approach,
we filter out all time-constant drivers of election results. In the second strategy, we perform
instrumental variable (IV) regressions. In the first step of the latter strategy, Fit and
Pn
j¼1 wij Fjt
are predicted according to a number of instruments: variables that are assumed to have a direct
effect on the budget variables but not on V ½t  1;t�it (after controlling for the other variables
included).
2.2 Data
The choice function in (1) is estimated for the municipal elections in Flanders in October
2000, 2006 and 2012 –the budgetary policy variables mentioned below were not registered uni-
formly before. Descriptions of the most important variables included are presented in Table 2.
These variables were collected and merged from the following sources: the research section of
the Flemish government, the election database of the Belgian Federal Public Service Interior
and Statistics Belgium (coordinated by the Federal Public Service Economy).
Not all of the majority parties appeared with the same name in the elections following their
policy terms in 2000, 2006 and 2012. For instance, in certain years, some of these parties
formed a cartel that did not exist in other years. Like Vermeir and Heyndels [5], we have there-
fore chosen not to analyse the election results in such situations. This reduces the theoretical
number of observations from 921 (i.e. three results in 307 municipalities) to 580. For 224
municipalities, we have multiple observations (two observations for 114 municipalities and
three observations in 110 municipalities). The identification of the FE regression models will
Table 2. Data description.
Variable Description Source Mean Standard
deviation
Percentage of votes for
majority parties
Total percentage of votes for the incumbent majority in the elections of 2000,
2006 and 2012 (relative to the total number of votes casted to one of the
participating parties)
Election database of the
Federal Public Service Interior
55.373 12.215
LIT Local income tax (i.e. levy on personal income taxes collected by the federal
government; expressed as a percentage)
Research section of the
Flemish government
6.970 1.026
LPT Local property tax (i.e. levy on property taxes collected by the Flemish Region) Research section of the
Flemish government
1229.400 321.094
Total expenditures Total expenditures per inhabitant (per year, €) Research section of the
Flemish government
1207.369 410.216
Investments Investments per inhabitant (per year, €) Research section of the
Flemish government
226.335 143.054
Personnel expenses Personnel expenses per inhabitant (per year, €) Research section of the
Flemish government
358.855 127.215





Number of parties in the incumbent majority Election database of the
Federal Public Service Interior
1.584 0.629
Income per inhabitant Income per inhabitant (per year, €) Statistics Belgium (Federal
Public Service Economy)
40444.090 9765.154
Surface area Surface area of the municipality (hectares) Research section of the
Flemish government
4334.759 2563.561
Inhabitants Number of inhabitants in the municipality Research section of the
Flemish government
15837.290 11786.640
Ratio of young people
to elderly people
Relationship between the number of individuals in the age category of 0–17
years and the number of individuals in the age category of 65 years and older
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be based on these municipalities only. By contrast, the identification of the OLS and 2SLS esti-
mates will also be based on the 81 unique observations for other municipalities.
In our analyses, we focus on six variables relating to municipal budget policy. First, we cap-
ture two tax variables: the local income tax (LIT) and the local property tax (LPT). The LIT is a
supplementary tax, i.e. it is levied in addition to an existing tax [6]. In this case, the existing tax
is the annual personal income tax that the federal government levies on the income of private
citizens [7]. More specifically, the municipality adds a supplementary levy to this basic tax in
the form of a percentage that it is free to determine. For instance, if the municipal council
imposes a tax rate of 7%, the taxpayer must pay €7 to the municipality for every €100 paid in
personal income tax. This tax is collected by the federal government, which subsequently
transfers the amount due to the taxpayer’s municipality. In 2000, 2006 and 2012, the LIT
accounted for about 33% of the total tax revenues of the Flemish municipalities [7].
Every taxpayer who owns property is obligated to pay LPT to the municipality. Each year,
the taxpayer receives a notice of assessment for the LPT, which must be paid within the stated
period. This amount is claimed by the Flemish Region, and the surcharges are subsequently
transferred to the Flemish municipalities [7]. We use the following example to clarify the cal-
culation of the LPT fee [7]. The LPT is calculated based on the indexed cadastral income of a
dwelling. Suppose that this indexed cadastral income amounts to €1000 and the municipality
has adopted a surcharge–which it is free to determine–of 1300. The first step involves calculat-
ing the share for the Flemish Region, which is a fixed fee of 2.5% of the indexed cadastral
income. In our example, €25 will go the Flemish Region. This amount is then multiplied by
1% of the LPT surcharge (€25 x 13) to determine the amount to be received by the municipal-
ity. In our example, this amounts to €325 per taxpayer [7].
We further include the total expenditures, investment expenditures and personnel expendi-
tures (in the taxpayer’s municipality and in the neighbouring municipalities) as budgetary pol-
icy variables. All of these indicators are expressed in euros, per year (in the election year) and
per inhabitant. Finally, we examine the effect of the long-term result of the income and expen-
diture variables (i.e. debt).
All budget variables are rated in December of the election year. This is later than the elec-
tion month of October, but given that the new elected council is only installed in January of
the next year and that budgetary reforms during the last weeks of the incumbent majority is
extremely uncommon, this is not expected to be a problem. We observe non-zero variation in
the total expenditures, investment expenditures, personnel expenditures and debt among all
224 municipalities with at least two observations. The same is true with respect to LIT and
LPT in the neighbouring municipalities. Variation in LIT and LPT, however, is only observed
in 123 and 153 municipalities, respectively. The identification of their association with voting
outcomes within the FE regression framework will be based on these municipalities only.
Consistent with Vermeir and Heyndels [5], we measure the following instrumental vari-
ables for the aforementioned budget variables: surface area, number of inhabitants and the
ratio of young people to elderly people (in the municipality and the neighbouring municipali-
ties). The validity of these instruments is conditional on two assumptions: they should be rele-
vant (in a sense that they predict our budget variables) and they should be exogenous (in a
sense that they do not have an independent effect on voting outcomes). Indeed, our instru-
ments are expected to correlate with fiscal policy. In particular, recent research has shown that
small and large cities compete with a different set of competitors for (mobile) capital, which
may yield diverging dynamics in vast and/or densely populated municipalities (versus smaller
ones) with respect to fiscal policy [5, 8–9]. Moreover, as a higher proportion of inhabitants
below the age of 18 decreases the proportion of tax payers among the population, a positive
association between the proportion of young people and tax rates is expected [5, 10]. By
Voting with your wallet? Municipal budget policy and election results
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221619 August 29, 2019 4 / 11
contrast, there are no clear indications that the used instruments are endogenous with respect
to voting outcomes. As argued by an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this article,
better incumbents may attract more people who in the end vote for the liked politician while
worse incumbents may make some people leave the town and others to vote against. However,
homeownership in Flanders is very high so that the tendency to leave one’s municipality is
rather low [11]. Therefore, we believe this source of endogeneity may only be relevant at the
long term. Nevertheless, both assumptions on which the causal interpretation of our 2SLS
results is based are tested empirically. First, with respect to the relevance of our instrumental
variables, we conduct F-tests of their joint significance in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions.
Second, with respect their exogeneity, we present overidentification tests [12]. Besides these
empirical tests, in line with Baert et al. [13], we present a robustness check in which alternative
combinations of instruments are used to show that our identification does not hinge on a par-
ticular set of instruments.
Given the limited number of instruments, we include no more than three budget variables
at a time in the various analyses. Following the primary attention that the literature devotes to
the effects of tax outcomes, we always include LIT and LPT as independent variables. These
are the only budget variables in the basic model, the estimation results of which are presented
in Table 3. In four extended models, the most important coefficients for which are presented
in Table 4, we combine LIT and LPT with one of the four other budget variables. This also
avoids problems of multicollinearity. In particular, total expenditures are strongly correlated
with investments (Pearson’s r = 0.543), expenditures for personnel (r = 0.703) and debt
(r = 0.408).
Again in line with Vermeir and Heyndels [5], we have included two further characteristics
of municipalities in all analyses: number of majority parties (political control variable) and
income per capita (economic control variable).
3. Results
The results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 are clear. When controlling for municipality fixed
effects or when the exogenous variation in the aforementioned instruments is exploited, there
are no significant associations between the aforementioned budget variables and the percent-
age of votes for the parties of the incumbent majority.
Specifically, the linear regression results reveal an association between the percentage of
votes for the incumbent majority and two budget components. First, as indicated in Column
(1) of Table 3, an increase of 1 (surcharge) unit in the LPT in the neighbouring municipalities
improves the percentage of votes for the incumbent majority in the municipality in question
by 0.007 percentage points (p = 0.009). Expressed in terms of standard deviations, an increase
of one standard deviation in the LPT in the neighbouring municipalities is associated with a
decrease of 0.184 standard deviations in the percentage of votes: 0.007 x 321.094 (standard
deviation for the LPT) divided by 12.215 (standard deviation for the percentage of votes). Sec-
ond, as indicated in Column (1) of Table 4, an increase of €1 per inhabitant in the municipality
debt worsens the percentage of votes for the incumbent majority in the municipality in ques-
tion by 0.001 of a percentage point (p = 0.043). In addition, a notable second-order result is
that, on average, majority parties in broader coalitions did better in subsequent elections in
Flanders in 2000, 2006 and 2012 than did majority parties in coalitions consisting of fewer
parties.
However, the significance of the aforementioned associations between fiscal policy and vot-
ing outcomes is eliminated by either fixed effects regression estimates or instrumental variable
regression estimates. Therefore, we must conclude that the associations based on linear
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regressions are due to the endogeneity of election results and budget policy, as discussed in
Section 2.1.
Further analyses indeed empirically indicate that the OLS regression results are biased.
First, based on model (3) of Table 3, we performed a Hausman endogeneity test. The assump-
tion of exogeneity of our variables capturing fiscal policy in our basic model is rejected
Table 3. Basic model: Complete regression results.
Dependent variable Percentage of votes for majority parties
Method of estimation OLS FE 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
LIT -0.305 (0.320) -0.977 (1.077) 0.725 (1.868)
LIT in neighbouring municipalities -0.570 (0.800) -0.416 (2.130) 6.814 (5.476)
LPT 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) -0.014 (0.011)
LPT neighbouring municipalities 0.007�� (0.003) 0.004 (0.009) 0.022 (0.013)
Percentage of votes for majority in the previous elections 0.781�� (0.049) 0.280�� (0.086) 0.721�� (0.062)
Number of majority parties 1.385 (0.931) 5.705�� (2.000) 2.923� (1.289)
Income per inhabitant/1000 0.093 (0.076) 0.175 (0.233) 0.233 (0.127)
2000 (reference)
2006 -0.539 (2.891) -4.133 (4.583) -4.890 (3.827)
2012 -2.031 (2.853) -8.339 (6.242) -9.144� (4.582)
Open VLD in majority in 2012 -2.649 (1.409) 3.309 (2.288) -3.648� (1.824)
N-VA in majority in 2012 18.764�� (1.409) 18.993�� (1.877) 17.948��(1.720)
CD&V in majority in 2012 -2.505 (1.695) 6.485� (2.682) -2.458 (1.963)
Sp.a in majority in 2012 -1.948 (1.631) 4.887 (2.551) -1.521 (2.026)
GROEN in majority in 2012 -1.677 (2.420) -0.165 (3.635) -1.872 (3.123)
Open VLD in majority in 2006 -3.363� (1.804) 4.056 (2.583) -4.547� (1.980)
N-VA in majority in 2006 (reference)
CD&V in majority in 2006 4.827�� (1.695) 11.279�� (2.476) 3.580 (1.855)
Sp.a in majority in 2006 -0.086 (1.661) 0.937 (2.431) -0.735 (1.993)
GROEN in majority in 2006 -3.078 (2.707) -1.271 (5.657) -2.881 (3.565)
Open VLD in majority in 2000 4.859�� (1.456) 10.945�� (2.582) 2.734 (1.752)
N-VA in majority in 2000 -1.018 (1.938) -7.443�� (2.217) -2.700 (3.010)
CD&V in majority in 2000 -0.576 (1.456) 4.352 (2.377) -0.254 (1.923)
Sp.a in majority in 2000 -1.479 (1.458) -1.700 (2.396) -1.452 (1.569)
GROEN in majority in 2000 -2.720 (2.591) -8.227 (11.096) -0.660 (3.682)
Constant 0.092 (6.930) 21.969 (17.626) -60.133�(29.592)
Sargan test (p-value) - - 0.353
First stage: F-test of instruments’ joint significance (p-value)
With respect to LIT - - 0.019
With respect to LIT in neighbouring municipalities - - 0.000
With respect to LPT - - 0.000
With respect to LPT neighbouring municipalities - - 0.000
Hausman endogeneity test (p-value) - - 0.038
N 580 580 580
Notes. The statistics reported are coefficient estimates, with standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses.
�� (�) indicates significance at the 1%- (5%-) level. OLS stands for ‘ordinary least squares’ (linear regression), FE for ‘fixed effects’ (linear regression with fixed effects at
the level of the municipality) and 2SLS for ‘two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variable estimates with six instruments: surface area, number of inhabitants and the
ratio of young people to elderly people in the municipality and in the neighbouring municipalities). LIT stands for local income tax and LPT for local property tax.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221619.t003
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(p = 0.038). Second, to further investigate the endogeneity of these variables, we run placebo
tests, in which we used the percentage of votes for the majority parties in the previous elections
as an outcome variable. The main results of these analyses are presented in columns (1a) to
(1c) of Table 5. These results indicate that at least LPT in neighbouring municipalities is corre-
lated with past values of the outcome, so that we cannot trust the (significant) OLS estimates in
Table 3 (and Table 4) and should rely on the fixed effects regression estimates and instrumen-
tal variable regression estimates.
By contrast, Table 3 provides empirical support for the two crucial assumptions underlying
our 2SLS approach mentioned in Section 2. First, the used instruments are significant predic-
tors of our budget variables–the p-value of the related F-tests is always lower than 0.050. Sec-
ond, the Sargan overidentification test for the 2SLS regression of Table 3 yields a p-value of
0.353, supporting the exogeneity of the used instruments with respect to our outcome variable.
In addition, in columns (2a) to (2c) of Table 5, we present the main estimation results of three
2SLS models, in which, starting from the specification of model (3) in Table 3, two out of six
Table 4. Extended models: Main regression results.
Dependent variable Percentage of votes for majority parties
Method of estimation OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS





























































































































































Additional control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
Notes. The statistics reported are coefficient estimates, with standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses.
�� (�) indicates significance at the 1%- (5%-) level. OLS stands for ‘ordinary least squares’ (linear regression), FE for ‘fixed effects’ (linear regression with fixed effects at
the level of the municipality) and 2SLS for ‘two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variable estimates with six instruments: surface area, number of inhabitants and the
ratio of young people to elderly people in the municipality and in the neighbouring municipalities). LIT stands for local income tax and LPT for local property tax.
Other variables included: percentage of the incumbent majority during the previous elections, number of majority parties, income per inhabitant, year effect for 2006,
year effect for 2012 and the party-year dummies, as listed in Table 3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221619.t004
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instruments are dropped. That is, in model (2a) we drop the instruments related to surface
area, in model (2b) those related to number of inhabitants and in model (2c) those related to
proportion of young inhabitants. Stated otherwise, identification of regressions 2a to 2c of
Table 5 is based on four out of the six instruments only. However, our finding of no associa-
tion between taxes and voting outcomes at the municipality level turns out to be fairly inde-
pendent of which instruments we use.
Table 5 presents also the results of two further robustness checks of the estimations in
Table 3—also the models in Table 4 survive these adaptations (results available on request).
First, in models (3a) to (3c), we opt for an alternative weighting scheme in which “neighbouring
municipalities” is not operationalised as adjacent municipalities but as municipalities from the
same district (with 22 districts of on average 13.95 Flemish municipalities). So, in terms of Eq
(1), in this alternative approach, wij equals 1 divided by the number of municipalities in the dis-
trict minus 1 in case i and j are in the same district and 0 otherwise. Second, as an alternative for
our fixed effects approach, we present OLS and 2SLS estimations with the percentage of votes
for the majority parties minus their percentage in the previous elections as the dependent vari-
able. Here, we drop the lagged outcome from the right-hand side of the regression model. How-
ever, none of these additional analyses yield results that conflict with those discussed above.
Table 5. Alternative specifications: Main regression results.
Analysis 1. PLACEBO TEST ON LAGGED
OUTCOMES
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 567 567 567 580 580 580 580 580 580 363 363
Notes. The statistics reported are coefficient estimates, with standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses.
�� (�) indicates significance at the 1%- (5%-) level. OLS stands for ‘ordinary least squares’ (linear regression), FE for ‘fixed effects’ (linear regression with fixed effects at
the level of the municipality) and 2SLS for ‘two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variable estimates with six instruments: surface area, number of inhabitants and the
ratio of young people to elderly people in the municipality and in the neighbouring municipalities; except otherwise stated). LIT stands for local income tax and LPT for
local property tax. Other variables included: percentage of the incumbent majority during the previous elections (except for column 1), number of majority parties,
income per inhabitant, year effect for 2006, year effect for 2012 and the party-year dummies, as listed in Table 3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221619.t005
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Finally, we explore the measured associations at the level of relevant subsamples. That is, we
re-estimate the models of Table 3 splitting the data by less and more stable majorities. In col-
umns 1a to 1c (2b to 2c) of Table 6, we present our basic models for the subsample of situations
in which the percentage of votes for the incumbent majority in the previous elections was
above (below) the overall average of 55.4%. In columns 3a to 3c (4a to 4c), we present the same
models for the subsample of observations with a majority comprising more than one (only
one) party. For none of these subsamples our regression models taking into account the endo-
geneity of taxation yield significant associations between tax rates at the municipality level and
voting outcomes. The same is true for the additional budget variables included in the models
of Table 4 (regression results available on request).
This result of no significant association between budgetary policy and voting outcomes in
Flanders might seem surprising, based on the clear association between certain budget vari-
ables and election results in other countries. The results are nevertheless in line with the find-
ings of Van Malderen and Gérard [3] for the neighbouring region of Wallonia. Moreover, our
findings correspond to certain anecdotal observations. Whereas budgetary issues are often a
point of political dispute and campaigns for elections at higher levels (e.g. regional, federal and
European), budgetary policy appears to be much less of an issue in municipal elections in Flan-
ders. Another explanation is that Flemish voters might not have a clear overview of exactly
what is included in the income and expenditures of municipalities. For example, as stated pre-
viously, the local income tax and local property tax are not collected directly by the municipal-
ity, but by the Flemish Region and the federal government, respectively, after which they are
transferred. Finally, the various budget variables are clearly interconnected: lower taxes are
often accompanied by lower expenditures (and vice versa). Flemish voters might be aware of
Table 6. Subsample analysis: main regression results.
Subsample 1. PERCENTAGE OF VOTES
FOR MAJORITY IN THE
PREVIOUS
ELECTIONS� 55.373
2. PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR MAJORITY
IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTIONS < 55.373
3. NUMBER OF MAJORITY PARTIES� 2 4. NUMBER OF MAJORITY PARTIES = 1
Dependent variable Percentage of votes for majority parties
Method of estimation OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE 2SLS







































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 315 315 315 265 265 265 299 299 299 281 281 281
Notes. The statistics reported are coefficient estimates, with standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses.
�� (�) indicates significance at the 1%- (5%-) level. OLS stands for ‘ordinary least squares’ (linear regression), FE for ‘fixed effects’ (linear regression with fixed effects at
the level of the municipality) and 2SLS for ‘two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variable estimates with six instruments: surface area, number of inhabitants and the
ratio of young people to elderly people in the municipality and in the neighbouring municipalities). LIT stands for local income tax and LPT for local property tax.
Other variables included: percentage of the incumbent majority during the previous elections, number of majority parties (except for columns 4a to 4c), income per
inhabitant, year effect for 2006, year effect for 2012 and the party-year dummies, as listed in Table 3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221619.t006
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this process of give and take, such that the various budget variables have no independent
effects.
4. Limitations and directions for future research
The main limitation of this research relates to the causal interpretation of our results. This is
only adequate in case the assumptions underlying our fixed effects regression framework and/
or our instrumental variable regression framework are met. As mentioned in Section 2, the
former approach basically assumes that all unobserved drivers of the election results are con-
stant while the second approach assumes that the included instruments have a direct effect on
the budget variables but not on the voting outcomes (after controlling for the other variables
included). Although these assumptions are supported by several diagnosis and robustness
checks and although our main finding is independent of which particular instruments we use,
we cannot fully guarantee causality.
Second, in our regression models, related to our limited number of instrumental variables,
we implicitly assume that interaction effects are zero. However, as argued by an anonymous
reviewer of an earlier version of this article, voters may take into account the level of expendi-
tures in the municipality when judging tax percentages. Therefore, we are in favour of future
studies investigating the potential interaction of certain budgetary variables in affecting elec-
tion outcomes.
Also the differing results in the literature concerning municipal budget policy and election
results call for further research. The conclusion that their association differs by country (and
possibly by period) has become clear, and the logical next step should involve explaining this
shifting association. Possible moderators of the effect of budget policy on election results can
be found at both the macro-level (e.g. powers of municipalities and the level of tax collection)
and the micro-level (e.g. the extent to which the population is interested in politics and the
economy). We eagerly anticipate future studies that can expose the empirical importance of
these moderators.
5. Conclusion
In our research, we addressed the relationship between voting behaviour at the municipal level
and a broad spectrum–the broadest to date in the literature–of budget elements of municipali-
ties and their neighbouring municipalities: municipal taxes, expenditures (total, for investments
and for personnel) and debt. To this end, we analysed 580 election results in Flanders. Our
results indicate that, in the voting booth, Flemish voters do not give any substantial consider-
ation to the financial policies of their municipalities. These results can be given a causal inter-
pretation conditional on the assumptions underlying our fixed effects regression framework
(i.e. unmeasured determinants of both tax policy and voting outcomes are time-constant) and/
or our instrumental variable regression framework (i.e. our instruments, or at least a subset of
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